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Abstract— A Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is an 
autonomous collection of mobile users that communicate over 
relatively bandwidth constrained wireless links. One of the 
main issues in such networks is performance- in a dynamically 
changing topology; the nodes are expected to be power-aware 
due to the bandwidth constrained network. Another issue in 
such networks is security - since every node participates in the 
operation of the network equally, malicious nodes are difficult 
to detect. There are several applications of mobile ad hoc 
networks such as disaster recovery operations, battle field 
communications, etc. The most active research area under 
MANET routing protocol is security. MANETs have certain 
unique characteristics that make them vulnerable to several 
types of attacks. Since they are deployed an open environment 
where all nodes co-operate in forwarding the packets in the 
network, malicious nodes are difficult to detect.   
Keywords—MANET, Ad-hoc Network, ARIADNE , 
CONFIDANT, Secure routing protocols.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Mobile Ad hoc networks (MANETs) have several advantages 
such as ease of deployment, speed of deployment and 
decreased dependency on a fixed infrastructure. However 
unique characteristics of MANETs topology such as open 
peer-to-peer architecture, dynamic network topology, shared 
wireless medium and limited resource (battery, memory and 
computation power) pose a number of non-trivial challenges 
to security design. 
Some of the issues and challenges that designer of secure 
protocols are described in this paper. These issues are 
analyzed with respect to the primary goals of a secure protocol 
– confidentiality, integrity and availability, authenticity and 
non-repudiation. There are many secure versions of MANETs 
routing protocols are available such as SEAD, ARIADNE, 
ARAN and SRP which are enhanced version of basic MANET 
routing protocols. These secure routing protocols are designed 
to provide security under various types of attacks. However 
only one cannot gives the security with all aspects so 
combined strategies are applied. 
CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING SECURE PROTOCOLS  
This section enumerates the issues and the challenges in 
designing secure protocols for MANETs [1]: 
Shared broadcast radio channel  
In MANETs, the radio channel is shared by all the nodes by 
broadcasting the data. Due to this, any malicious node can 
easily―snoopǁ over the data thereby violating confidentiality 
in the network. This can be minimized by using a directional 
antenna. 
Hostile environment  
MANETs are typically deployed in hostile environments such 
as battlefield. In such cases, the nodes themselves are prone to 
attacks. Thus, not only must the protocol address attacks from 
outside a network, but also the attacks launched from within 
the network. Such internal attacks are severe and can violate 
all the goals of security. 
Decentralized architecture 
In wired networks and wireless infrastructure-based networks 
(such as Wireless LANs), there is a fixed server which 
authenticates the users and handles key management. For 
example, a RADIUS server for authentication and a certificate 
server for key management may be installed as depicted in fig 
1. Here, wireless station C1 sends its authentication 
credentials to the authenticator (Access Point B) using a 
protocol such as EAPOL, which in turn forwards the 
information to the back-end authentication server. 
 
Centralized authentication scheme in Wireless LANs 
Such a centralized scheme is infeasible in an ad hoc network 
due to its distributed nature. 
Dynamic Topology  
The nodes in a MANET are highly dynamic in nature and 
hence the topology of the network keeps changing. Due to this 
the trust relationship between nodes also keeps changing. For 
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example, if any malicious node is detected in a network, its 
relationship with the surrounding nodes changes. Due to this, 
the security protocol must also adapt to these changes. 
Power limitations  
The nodes in a MANET are devices such as PDAs, laptops, 
etc. which run on batteries. The addition of security ―layersǁ 
adds more performance overhead and also consumes network 
bandwidth. One of the severe implications of this is that nodes 
are easily vulnerable to attacks such as Denial of Service 
(DoS). Thus the security solution must also be power aware. 
 
II. SECURE ROUTING IN MANETS 
This paper primarily focuses on the security issues from a 
network layer perspective. Several routing protocols for 
MANETs exist though none of them address the most 
important issue, namely, security. In order to study the attacks 
and threats, and to devise a protocol which addresses them, an 
understanding of the operating environment is needed. The 
environment can be a managed environment, where a common 
trusted authority exists such as a RADIUS server or it can be 
an open environment where there is no a priori trust 
relationship between the nodes. For example in a battlefield, 
the nodes have a common trust authority which executes the 
key management functions. MANETs typically fall in to the 
open environment type since the nodes are mobile and they 
establish a connection dynamically. Another possible type of 
environment is the managed-open environment, where the 
nodes have already established some security infrastructure. 
This acts as a starting point for establishing the trust 
relationship between nodes. Furthermore, the environment can 
be managed-hostile, which depicts scenarios such as military 
networks, where security is of prime importance. 
Some of the secure versions of MANET routing protocols are 
described as: 
ARIADNE  
The ARIADNE routing protocol [1] proposed by Yi-Chun Hu, 
Adrian Perrig, etc. prevents against several types of active and 
passive attacks. Active attacks are those where a malicious 
node eavesdrops on a network and injects fake packets. On the 
other hand, passive attacks are threats against the 
confidentiality of the communication rather than the network‘s 
function. Active attacks can be of several types such as 
Active-0-1 (in which the attacker owns one node), Active-1-x 
(in which the attacker owns one compromised node and 
distributes the cryptographic keys to its x-1 other nodes), and 
Active-y-x. In addition, an attacker that has compromised 
nodes is called an Active VC attacker when it owns all nodes 
through a vertex cut in the network that partitions the good 
nodes into multiple sets, thereby forcing the good nodes to 
communicate through the attacker nodes. The wormhole 
attack is an example of this type of attack. 
The ARIADNE protocol is a secure routing protocol based on 
DSR [14], which withstands node compromise and uses 
efficient symmetric key cryptography. The assumption made 
in ARIADNE is that the nodes can authenticate routing 
messages using three schemes – shared secrets between each 
pair of nodes, shared secret between the communicating nodes 
combined with broadcast authentication or by using digital 
signatures. ARIADNE works in two phases, route discovery 
and route maintenance similar to DSR. They are in turn 
described below – 
(a) Route Discovery: In order to authenticate the RREQ 
packets, every source node adds a Message Authentication 
Code (MAC) computed with the shared key between the 
source and the destination (KSD). In order to verify the 
intermediate nodes in a RREQ packet, every node along the 
path from source to destination authenticates the new 
information in RREQ packet using a TESLA key [2]. The 
destination node will buffer the RREP packet until the 
intermediate nodes can release their corresponding TESLA 
keys, after which a security condition is met. 
Now, the target adds a MAC to the RREP packet hashed with 
KSD and forwards it on the reverse path to the source node. 
Further, in order to prevent any malicious node from removing 
any previous hop from the route, a technique called per-hop 
hashing is used [3]. 
(b) Route maintenance: Route maintenance in ARIADNE is 
similar to DSR, where a node forwarding a packet to the next 
hop along the source route sends a RERR packet back to the 
originating node if it is unable to deliver the packet to next 
hop. The sender node authenticates an RERR packet by 
checking the time delay in receiving the packet. By using a 
mechanism such as TESLA, each node that will be able to 
authenticate the RERR packet buffers it until it can be 
authenticated. 
Ariadne prevents against both active and passive attacks. 
Specifically it prevents attacks using fabrication such as 
forming routing loops by spoofing. It also prevents against the 
black hole attack by using per hop hashing mechanism and 
many kinds of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks due to flooding 
of route request packets in the network. Furthermore, it is also 
efficient since it is based on a reactive protocol which has a 
better performance than table-driven protocols, and symmetric 
key cryptography. 
CONFIDANT 
CONFIDANT [4] (Cooperation of Nodes: Fairness In 
Dynamic Ad-hoc Networks) is a secure on demand routing 
protocol for making misbehavior nodes unattractive for other 
nodes to communicate with. It is based on selective altruism 
and utilitarianism. It aims at detecting and isolating 
misbehaving nodes, thus making it unattractive to deny 
cooperation. Trust relationships and routing decisions are 
based on experienced, observed or reported routing and 
forwarding behavior of other nodes. The design of 
CONFIDANT assumes that the network layer is based on 
DSR. CONFIDANT consists of the following components: the 
monitor, the reputation system, the path manager, and the trust 
manager. Each component takes its function from its name. 
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The monitor is for the neighborhood nodes to record (by 
listening to other communication) communication between 
other nodes. The trust manager deals with the incoming and 
outgoing ALARM messages. ALARM messages are sent by 
the trust manager of a node to warn others of malicious nodes. 
The reputation system is mainly used to avoid a centralized 
rating, local rating lists and/or black lists maintained at each 
node and potentially exchanged with friends. Similar 
reputation systems are used in some online auctioning 
systems. They provide a means of obtaining a quality rating of 
participants of transactions by having both the buyer and the 
seller give each other feedback on how their activities were 
perceived and evaluated. Path manager performs the following 
functions: i) path re-ranking according to security metric, e.g. 
reputation of the nodes in the path, ii) deletion of paths 
containing malicious nodes, iii) action on receiving a request 
for a route from a malicious node, e.g. ignore, do not send any 
reply, and iv) action on receiving request for a route 
containing a malicious node in the source route, e.g. ignore, 
alert the source. When the monitor detects an anomaly, it 
informs the reputation system to take an action, which 
maintains a local ratings list. These lists are potentially 
exchanged with other nodes; the trust monitor handles input 
from other nodes. If a list is received from a highly trusted 
node, the receiver can directly place information from the list 
into its local ratings list. On the other hand if a list is received 
from an un-trusted source, the receiver can completely ignore 
it or give it substantially less weight than a list received from a 
more trusted node. Finally, the path manager chooses paths 
from the node‘s route cache based on a blacklist and the local 
ratings list. The path manager also specifies the reaction to a 
REQUEST from a node on the blacklist or to a REQUEST 
that has traversed a node on the blacklist. 
CONFIDANT maintains global reputation values. Each 
node maintains a single reputation value for every other node 
with which it interacts, where this value combines all the 
various functional reputation values. Using global reputations 
may lead to several other issues [5]. In particular, a global 
reputation value may enable a node to hide bad behavior with 
respect to one function by correctly supporting another 
function. Global reputation values, therefore, do not reveal the 
importance placed on different services by different nodes. 
The distributed nature of the mechanism can lead to several 
inconsistencies in the reputation value. It can also lead to 
possible attacks on the reputation value such as advertising 
false high rating or false low rating about another node and 
negative discrimination (a node refuses services to only some 
nodes). In general, a simple local reputation mechanism will 
be more efficient than a complex reputation mechanism. 
CORE  
Selfishness that causes lack of node activity cannot be solved 
by classical security means that aim at verifying the 
correctness and integrity of an operation. CORE [6] suggests a 
generic mechanism based on reputation to enforce cooperation 
among the nodes of an ad hoc network to prevent selfish 
behavior. Each network entity keeps track of other entities 
collaboration using a technique called reputation. The 
reputation is calculated based on various types of information 
on each entity‘s rate of collaboration. Since there is no 
incentive for a node to maliciously spread negative 
information about other nodes, simple denial of service attacks 
using the collaboration technique itself are prevented. 
Three reputation systems are used in CORE: subjective 
reputation, indirect reputation and functional reputation. The 
subjective reputation is calculated directly from the subject 
observation. A subjective reputation (direct observation) at 
time t from the point of view of subject s is calculated using a 
weighted mean of the observation‘s rating factors, giving more 
relevance to the past observations. Indirect reputation reflects 
the value given to the final reputation by the characteristics of 
the complex societies. Functional reputation is used to apply a 
function f (which could be a forwarding function, packet 
function, or any other function) to the subjective reputation 
value or/ and the indirect value. The function reputation may 
apply more than one function to the same input and use a third 
function to get a final functional value. 
CORE consists of three components: network entity, 
reputation table and the watchdog mechanism. The network 
entity comprises of the mobile nodes in the network. Each 
node is enriched with a set of Reputation Tables (RT) and a 
Watchdog Mechanism (WD). The RT and the WD together 
constitute the basis of the collaborative reputation mechanism. 
These two components allow each entity to observe and 
classify entities that get involved in a request/ reply process, 
reflecting the cooperative behavior of the involved parts. The 
RT is defined as a data structure stored in each network entity. 
The watchdog mechanism detects misbehaving nodes. 
 
Ambiguous collision 
The ambiguous collision problem due to exposed terminal 
may prevent node A from overhearing transmissions from 
node B. As Fig 2 illustrates, a packet collision occurs at node 
A while it is listening for node B to forward the packet. In 
such a case, Node A will never know if node B ever forwarded 
the packet. Because of this uncertainty, node A should instead 
continue to watch node B over a period of time. 
In the receiver collision problem, Fig 3, node A can only tell 
whether node B has sent the packet to node C, but it cannot 
tell if node C has received it. If a collision occurs at node C, 
node A only sees that node B has forwarded the packet and 
assumes that C has successfully received it. Thus, node B 
could skip retransmitting the packet and evade detection. 
 
Receiver Collision 
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False misbehavior can occur when nodes falsely report other 
nodes as misbehaving. A malicious node could attempt to 
partition the network by claiming that some nodes in the 
forwarding path are misbehaving. For instance, node A could 
report that node B is not forwarding packets when in fact it is. 
This will cause node S to mark node B as misbehaving, 
whereas the culprit is node A. This behavior, however, is easy 
to address. Since node A is passing messages onto node B (as 
verified by node S), then any Acknowledgments from D to S 
will go through node A to node S, and node S will wonder 
why it received replies from node D when supposedly node B 
dropped packets in the forward direction. In addition, if node 
A drops Acknowledgments to hide them from node S, the 
node B can detect this misbehavior and report it to D. 
Another problem is that a misbehaving node that can control 
its transmission power can avoid the watchdog [9]. A node 
could limit its transmission power such that the signal is 
strong enough to be overheard by the previous node but too 
weak to be received by the true recipient. Also, a node can 
circumvent the watchdog by dropping packets at a lower rate 
than the watchdog‘s configured minimum misbehavior 
threshold (partial dropping). Although the watchdog will not 
detect this node as misbehaving, this node is forced to forward 
at the threshold bandwidth. In this way the watchdog serves to 
enforce this minimum bandwidth. For the watchdog to work 
properly it must know where a packet should be in two hops. 
Watchdog Mechanism — Many Protocols use watchdog 
mechanism. Watchdog mechanism has been introduced by [7]. 
Fig 4 illustrates the working of the watchdog mechanism. 
Node A cannot transmits all the way to node C, but it can 
listen the node B‘s traffic. Thus when node A transmits a 
packet for node B to be forwarded to node C, node A can 
often tell if node B has transmitted the packet. If encryption is 
not performed separately for each link, which can be 
expensive, then node A can also tell if node B has tampered 
with the payload or the header. 
 
Watchdog Mechanism 
The watchdog is implemented by maintaining a buffer to see if 
there is a match in the packets received and packets 
forwarded. If so, the packet in the buffer is removed and 
forgotten by the watchdog, since it has been forwarded on 
towards its final destination. If the packet has remained in the 
buffer for longer than a certain timeout, the watchdog 
increments a failure tally (RT) for the node responsible for 
forwarding the packet. If a tally exceeds a certain threshold 
bandwidth, it determines that the node is misbehaving and 
sends a message to the source notifying it of the misbehaving 
node. The advantage of the watchdog mechanism is that it can 
detect misbehaving nodes at forwarding level and not just the 
link level. The disadvantage is that it might not detect 
misbehaving nodes in presence of ambiguous collusions, 
receiver collusions, limited transmission power, false 
misbehavior, collision and partial dropping [8]. 
SAODV  
The black-hole attack is a killer attack for AODV. In a black 
hole attack a malicious node acts as an intermediate node, and 
advertises itself on the shortest path to the destination, which 
will make the sender node send all the packets through it. The 
malicious node will then simply drop the packets. 
SAODV [13] was introduced to combat the black-hole attack. 
One solution is to prevent the intermediate nodes from sending 
a RouteReply message. This is still not good enough because 
the destination node might select a route that has the malicious 
node, which will then again drop all the packets. 
Also, by not making the intermediate node send a RouteReply 
message, the delay in the network will increase. To solve this 
problem the Further RouteRequest message has been 
introduced in SAODV. When the intermediate node sends a 
RouteReply message to the source, the source will send a 
quick Further RouteRequest message to the neighbors of that 
intermediate node (the RouteReply message will contain 
information about the next hop on the route). The neighbor 
node will reply with Further RouteReply message which must 
contain the intermediate node listed in its route (that has sent 
the RouteReply message). If it does not, then that neighbor 
node is a malicious node. 
The approach adopted in SAODV is adequate for solving the 
black-hole problem but it fails to detect the wormhole attacks 
(when two malicious nodes works together to attack the 
network). 
Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) 
Authenticated Routing for Ad hoc Networks (ARAN) [10] is a 
secure routing protocol based on the AODV protocol. The 
assumption in ARAN is that every node has a certificate that is 
signed by a trusted authority. The route discovery and route 
maintenance mechanisms are based on AODV and elaborated 
as follows – 
Let us assume that a source node S wants to discover a route 
to destination node D. Also assume that A, B and C are three 
intermediate nodes on the path from S to D, that their 
certificates are certA, certB and certC and their private keys 
are Ka, Kb, Kc respectively. During the route discovery phase, 
a source node broadcasts a RREQ packet signed with its 
public key. The packet contains the destination node‘s address 
D, source node‘s certificate certS, a nonce N and a timestamp 
t. The nonce and timestamp ensure that the route is fresh. A 
sequence of route discovery messages is shown below: 
S → * : (RREQ, D, certS, N, t) Ks 
A → * : ((RREQ, D, certS, N, t) Ks) Ka,certA 
B → * : ((RREQ, D, certS, N, t) Ks) Kb,certB 
C → * : ((RREQ, D, certS, N, t) Ks) Kc,certC 
(NOTE: * denotes a broadcast) 
As shown, each intermediate node (such as A, B or C) that 
forwards the RREQ packet checks the signature(s) of the 
previous node on the packet by extracting the public key from 
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the certificate. Further, it removes the previous node‘s 
signature, signs the RREQ packet with its own private key, 
adds the certificate to the header and broadcasts the packet to 
its neighboring nodes. This process continues until the packet 
reaches the destination D. 
D → C : (RREP, S, certD, N, t) Kd 
C → B : ((RREP, S, certD, N, t) Kd) Kc,certC 
B → A : ((RREP, S, certD, N, t) Kd) Kb,certB 
A → S : ((RREP, S, certD, N, t) Kd) Ka,certA 
On receiving the RREQ, D will create a route reply 
(RREP) packet, add the source address S, its own certificate 
certD, a nonce and a timestamp and sign it with its private 
key. An intermediate route C on receiving the RREP packet 
will in turn verify the signature(s) of the previous node. For 
example, when node B receives the RREP packet from node 
C, it will verify the signature of node C. It will then remove 
C‘s certificate, sign the packet with its own private key Kb, 
add its certificate certB and unicast it to the next node A on 
the reverse path as shown above. Nodes B and A will also add 
a routing table entry to node D indicating that the next hop is 
C and B respectively. 
When node B discovers a broken link to C, it initiates route 
maintenance as shown: 
B → A : ((RERR, S, D, certB, N, t) Kb) 
A → S : ((RERR, S, D, certB, N, t) Kb) 
Thus it sends a RERR packet, the source node‘s address, the 
destination address, its own certificate certB, a nonce and a 
timestamp signed with its private key to its previous node A. 
Node A will forward this unchanged to the source node S. 
ARAN prevents against attacks which modify the routing 
information since it uses public key authentication. However, 
it is vulnerable to DoS attacks which flood the network with 
fake packets due to the use of certificates which require high 
bandwidth and processing power of nodes. 
SAR 
Security Aware Ad-Hoc Routing (SAR) protocol [11] makes 
use of trust levels (security attributes assigned to nodes) to 
make informed, secure routing decisions. Current routing 
protocols discover the shortest path between two nodes. But 
SAR can discover a path with desired security attributes (e.g., 
a path through nodes with a particular shared key). 
A node initiating route discovery sets the desired security level 
for the route, i.e., the required minimal trust level for nodes 
participating in the query/ reply propagation. Nodes at that 
have the trust level share symmetric encryption keys. 
Intermediate nodes of different trust levels cannot decrypt in 
transit routing packets or determine whether the required 
security attributes can be satisfied, therefore drop all such 
packets. Only the nodes with the correct key can read the 
header and forward the packet. So, if a packet has reached the 
destination, it must have been propagated by nodes having the 
same trust level. 
SAR approach can be extended to any routing protocol. 
However, it has been presented as an extension of AODV. 
Most of AODV‘s original behavior such as on-demand 
discovery using flooding, reverse path maintenance and 
forward path setup via RouteRequest and RouteReply (RREP) 
messages is retained. The RREQ (Route REQuest) and the 
RREP (Route REPly) packets formats are modified to carry 
additional security information. The RREQ packet has an 
additional field called RQ_SEC_REQIREMENT that indicates 
the required security level for the route the sender wishes to 
discover. This could be a bit vector. An intermediate node at 
the required trust level, updates the RREQ packet by updating 
another new field, RQ_SEC_GUARANTEE field. The 
RQ_SEC_GUARANTEE field contains the minimum security 
offered in the route. This can be achieved if each intermediate 
node at the required trust level performs an AND operation 
with RQ_SEC_GUARANTEE field it receives and puts the 
updated value back into the RQ_SEC_GUARANTEE field 
before forwarding the packet. Finally the packet reaches the 
destination if a route exists. 
In the RREP packet one additional field is also added. When 
an RREQ successfully traverses the network to the sender, the 
RQ_SEC_GUARANTEE represents the minimum security 
level in the entire path from source to destination. So the 
destination copies this from the RREQ to the RREP, into a 
new field called RP_SEC_GUARANTEE field. The sender 
can use this value to determine the security level on the whole 
path, since the sender can find routes which offer more 
security than asked for, with which he can make informed 
decisions. 
A major drawback in SAR is that it involves significant 
encryption overhead, since each intermediate node has to 
perform encryption/decryption operation. Also, the nodes are 
classified based on the level of trust. This creates a 
hierarchical trust based network. SAR evaluates the rust level 
of routes based only on hierarchy. This hierarchy is 
predetermined and therefore implies that the trust level of the 
nodes is static. Furthermore, nodes can spoof each other‘s trust 
level. The protocol in general does not scale well. 
SPREAD 
The basic idea of SPREAD (Security Protocol for reliable at a 
Delivery) [12] is to transform a secret message into multiple 
shares by secret sharing schemes and then deliver the shares 
via multiple independent paths to the destination so that even 
if a small number of nodes that are used to relay the message 
shares are compromised, the secret message as a whole in not 
compromised. Figure 4.5, shows SPREAD mechanism. 
The node could make the final decision whether a message is 
delivered at certain time instant according to the security level 
and the availability of multiple paths. Also, the chosen set of 
multiple paths maybe changed from time to time to avoid any 
potential capture of those multiple paths. SPREAD is a 
mechanism to distribute the secrecy, first by secret sharing 
algorithm at the source node and then by multi-path routing 
while shares are delivered across the network, so that in the 
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event that a small number of shares are compromised, the 
secret as a whole will not be compromised. 
 
SPREAD Mechanism 
SPREAD considers the security when massages are 
transmitted across the network, assuming the source and 
destination are trusted. SPREAD, scheme cannot address the 
confidentiality alone. It only statistically enhances such 
service. For example, it is still possible for adversaries to 
compromise all the shares, e.g. by collusion.  
 
III. CONCLUSION 
In this paper different secure versions of AODV, DSR and 
TORA protocols have also been reviewed. Traditionally, a 
secure ad hoc network has to meet different security 
requirements, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, 
Authentication and nonrepudiation. Different digital attacks 
have been developed to undermine the security of mobile Ad 
hoc networks. 
ARIADNE provides point-to-point authentication of a routing 
message using a message authentication code (MAC) and a 
shared key between the two parties. ARIADNE copes with 
attacks performed by malicious nodes that modify and 
fabricate routing information, with attacks using 
impersonation and, in an advanced version, with the wormhole 
attack. 
CONFIDANT is an on demand routing protocol designed for 
detecting and isolating misbehaving node. It maintains a 
global reputation value that leads to several issues like hiding 
bad behavior node. Distributed nature of mechanism leads to 
several inconsistencies in reputation value. 
CORE is based on watchdog mechanism that can detect 
misbehaving nodes at forwarding level and not just the link 
level. A main problem with the watchdog approach is the 
vulnerability to blackmail attacks. 
In SAODV, ownership of certified public keys enables 
intermediate enable intermediate nodes to authenticate all in-
transit routing packets. The SAODV can be used to protect the 
route discovery mechanism of the AODV by providing 
security features like integrity, authentication and non-
repudiation. 
The ARAN protocol protects against exploits using 
modification, fabrication and impersonation. It uses 
asymmetric cryptography makes it a very costly protocol to 
use in terms of CPU and energy usage. It is also not immune 
to the wormhole attack. 
SAR uses security information to dynamically control the 
choice of routes installed in the routing table. SAR will find 
the optimal route if all the nodes on the shortest path satisfy 
the security requirements. SAR may fail to find the route if the 
ad hoc network does not have a path on which all nodes on the 
path satisfy the security requirements in spite of being 
connected. 
SPREAD provides security only when message are 
transmitted across the network. It assumes that the source and 
destination are trusted. It only enhances services such as 
confidentiality. These secure routing protocols provide many 
approaches to secure the MANETs, however there are still 
many open challenges remain unsolved because some of the 
secure routing protocols are designed by considering some 
certain known attacks but when an unknown attack is 
encountered, these protocols may collapse. Another reason 
may be due to achieving higher security always leads to more 
computation on each mobile node. In MANETs environment, 
resources are very limited, thus there will always be a trade 
between more security and more performance.  
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